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one result of Jackson may be an expensive and troublesome burden
for the affected states. Of course, if a decision is otherwise sound,
the fact that it has an upsetting effect upon state criminal adminis-
tration does not make it wrong; but here the total accomplishment
of the majority opinion may not offset the problems it creates. If
in the remedial proceedings and in subsequent trials a procedure no
more" fair" than the New York practice is used, the effort expended
by the Court in pursuit of constitutional objectives was futile indeed.
Eldon L. Youngblood
Law To Be Applied Following Section 140 4 (a) Transfers
I. INTRODUCTION
In Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert,' the Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens was available in federal court.
This doctrine allows dismissal of a case if the forum chosen by the
plaintiff is so inappropriate and inconvenient that it is better to begin
anew in another court. In determining whether the doctrine of forum
non conveniens should be applied, a court must consider the relative
advantages and obstacles to a fair trial and the convenience of the
parties and witnesses.! Mr. Justice Jackson stated in the Gulf Oil
opinion, however, that although a plaintiff should not be permitted
to choose an inconvenient forum merely to harass the defendant,
"unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plain-
tiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."' Forum non con-
veniens is subject to careful limitation not only because the plaintiff
is denied the generally accorded privilege of bringing an action in
the forum of his choice (assuming that jurisdiction and venue are
proper), but also because a meritorious cause of action could be im-
rights would be fulfilled by a special state hearing to determine the issue of voluntariness
and that a new trial, though permissible, was not mandatory. The Court reasoned that if the
confession is there found to have been voluntary the original trial will be exonerated. Of
course, if a finding of involuntariness is made a new trial must ensue. Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 393-96 (1964). This means of satisfying petitioner's habeas corpus rights
appears to be unique, It was criticized severely by the dissent. Id. at 427. Perhaps it repre-
sents an attempt by the Court to alleviate the administrative burdens which many of its
recent decisions have thrust upon the states.
S330 U.S. 501 (1947).
Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
sGulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
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paired by application of the law of an alternative forum.4 Forum non
conveniens is not a ground for dismissal unless the interest of justice
requires the court to decline jurisdiction.' Thus, even though the
convenience factor might favor dismissal, it should be denied unless
an alternative forum is open to the plaintiff. The general venue
statutes, however, usually give plaintiffs a wide enough choice of
courts that they are assured alternative forums in which to bring
their causes of action.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens as applied in federal court
was codified in section 1404 (a) of the Judicial Code, which author-
izes the transfer of a proper case to another district or division where
it might have been brought. Section 1404 (a) is a remedial statute
which authorizes the judge, upon the motion of either party, to
transfer a civil action to a more convenient forum.8 The burden of
establishing that the action should be transferred is on the party
moving to transfer." The exercise of the transfer power is committed
to the sound discretion of the district court to be exercised in light
of all the circumstances of the particular case relevant to the interest
of justice and convenience of the parties and witnesses."
Prior to the adoption of section 1404 (a), if a forum was deemed
improper under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the suit was
dismissed. The remedy under section 1404 (a) is transfer; dismissal by
the court is erroneous.' Thus, the statute supplants the doctrine of
' Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955) (limitation statutes of alternative juris-
diction would bar plaintiff's action).
'Felchlin v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 136 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
628 U.S.C.A. §§ 1391, 1392 (1958).
728 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (1958) states: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been brought." Hereinafter the statute will be cited in
shortened form, § 1404(a).
'Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960).
"Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851
(1950); Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1949).
"6Trust Co. of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R.R., 183 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1950); Brown
v. Woodring, 174 F. Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1959). It has been held that the judge has
more discretion to transfer under § 1404(a) than under forum non conveniens; i.e., trans-
fer under § 1404(a) can be ordered on a lesser showing of inconvenience than would justify
dismissal under forum non conveniens. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
"Collins v. American Auto Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 802 (1956). Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens dismissal is a final order-
and thus appealable. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955). Under § 1404(a) an
order granting or denying a requested transfer is interlocutory and not immediately appeal-
able, Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182.F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851
(1950), but may be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v..
Hugh Breeding, Inc., 247 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,.355. U.S. 880 (1"957).
Review of an order granting or denying transfer, however, may be obtained by mandamus.
Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111, (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
953 (1951). Contra: Great Northern Ry. v. Hyde, 245 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 872 (1957).
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forum non conveniens in the federal court system. Nevertheless, the
federal courts still can make use of the forum non conveniens doc-
trine in one situation; if a federal district court believes a foreign
court is the more convenient forum, although it cannot transfer the
case, it still may apply the traditional rules of forum non conveniens
and dismiss the action."
The Supreme Court first considered the implications of the limit-
ing phrase in section 1404(a), "where it [the action] might have
been brought," in Hoffman v. Blaski.1" In that case the district to
which the defendant desired transfer lacked both venue and juris-
diction over the defendant. The Supreme Court held that regardless
of the defendant's consent to venue and jurisdiction in the proposed
transferee forum, a forum which had been improper for both venue
and for service of process was not a forum where the action might
have been brought. 4 The court held that for a transfer to be granted,
the plaintiff must have had an independent right to bring the action
in the proposed transferee forum at the time of institution of the
suit.
II. LAW APPLICABLE IN A TRANSFERRED CASE
There have been few cases that have considered the question of
whether or not under a section 1404 (a) transfer the law of the
transferee or the transferor state will apply, i.e., whether or not a
transfer is accompanied by a change in the applicable state law. In
Headrick v. Atchison, T. &q S.F. Ry.," the plaintiff was a Missouri
resident and the defendant railroad a Kansas Corporation. The cause
of action arose in California, but that state's statute of limitations
had run. The plaintiff instituted suit in a New Mexico state court
where the defendant was amenable to process and suit was not barred
by limitations. The defendant removed the case to a federal district
court in New Mexico on the ground of diversity and then moved to
have the case transferred to a federal district court in California. The
Tenth Circuit concluded that if the case were transferred to Cali-
fornia, the district court in the transferee state must apply the sub-
stantive law and policies of the transferor state. Thus, even if the
case were transferred, the New Mexico statute of limitations still
would apply.
This rule also was applied in H. L. Green Co. v. MacMahon," in
l'Gross v. Owen, 221 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
1363 U.S. 335 (1960).
14 Id. at 343.
'5182 F.2d 305 (2Oth Cir. 1950).t" 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963).
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which the plaintiff brought an action in the southern district of New
York. The defendant moved to transfer the case to the southern
district of Alabama. The court granted transfer and stated: "Al-
though as a matter of federal policy a case may be transferred to a
more convenient part of the system, whatever rights the parties have
acquired under state law should be unaffected. The case should
remain as it was in all respects but location."'
III. VAN DUSEN v. BARRACK
Van Dusen v. Barrack" is a wrongful death case arising from the
crash of a commercial airliner in the Boston harbor on October 4,
1960. As a result of the crash, over 150 actions for personal injury
and death were filed against the airline, various manufacturers, the
United States, and the Massachusetts Port Authority. Forty wrongful
death actions were filed in the eastern district of Pennsylvania by
personal representatives of the victims of the crash," the suits being
based on the wrongful death statute of Massachusetts."0 The defen-
dants moved under section 1404(a) to transfer these Pennsylvania
actions to a federal district court in Massachusetts where over one
hundred actions already were pending and most of the witnesses
resided. The district court granted the motion and held that the trans-
fer was justified regardless of whether the transferred actions would
be governed by the laws and choice-of-law rules of Pennsylvania or
of Massachusetts," and that transfer was not precluded because of
the plaintiffs failure to qualify to sue as personal representatives of
the decedents under Massachusetts law.
By writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, the plaintiffs suc-
cessfully contended that the district court erred and should vacate
its order of transfer."' The Third Circuit, relying on rule 17(b),"
" Id. at 652-53. The plaintiff erroneously assumed that the transferee state law would
apply and was apprehensive that his statutory claim would be prejudiced by the transferee
state's statute of limitations and that his common law claim, which he had moved to join
with his statutory claim prior to the motion to transfer, would be disallowed on the same
ground.
'a376 U.S. 612 (1964).
"
5 Federal jursidiction was based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C.A. 5 1332 (1958).
"°Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229, § 2 (1955) states: "If the proprietor of a common
carrier of passengers . . . causes the death of a passenger, he . . . shall be liable in dollars
in the sum of not less than two thousand nor more than twenty thousand dollars, to be
assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the defendant or of his . . . servants
or agents .... .. The statute was amended, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229, S 2 (Supp.
1962), to raise the maximum recovery allowed to thirty thousand dollars.
"Popkin v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Penn. 1962).
'Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1963).
"
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b): "Capacity to Sue or Be Sued. The capacity of an individual,
other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined
1964]
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held that a section 1404 (a) transfer could be granted only if, at the
time the suits were brought, the plaintiffs had qualified to sue in
Massachusetts. In support of its holding the court cited Hoffman v.
Blaski" That case established the rule that "unless the plaintiff had
an unqualified right to bring suit in the transferee forum at the time
he filed his original complaint, transfer to that district is not au-
thorized by section 1404 (a).""s The Third Circuit, however, extended
the Hoffman rule and increased the restrictions on transfers to con-
venient federal forums. In the Hoffman case the proposed transferee
forum lacked both venue and jurisdiction; in the instant case both
jurisdiction and venue are proper, but the plaintiff had not qualified
to sue in the transferee district.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and in its first considera-
tion of the question stated that the Headrick and H. L. Green Co.
cases properly reflect the underlying purposes of section 1404(a).
Both the district court and the court of appeals erred in the assump-
tion as to the state law to be applied in the transferee forum. The
Supreme Court held that a section 1404 (a) transfer authorizes only
a change of courtrooms and not a change of applicable law; i.e., the
transferee court must apply the laws of the state of the transferor
court. In addition, rule 17(b) was interpreted similarly so that the
plaintiff's lack of capacity in the transferee forum will not prevent
the defendant from transferring; i.e., the capacity to sue will be
governed by the laws of the transferor district court. Thus, if the
instant cases are subsequently transferred to the district court in
Massachusetts, they must remain Pennsylvania cases controlled by
the law and policy of that state. Whatever rights the plaintiffs
acquired upon the filing of their suits will be unaffected by the
transfer.
In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 6 and in subsequent cases, 7 the Supreme
Court established the principal of uniforminity of outcome within
a state by holding that a federal court enforcing a state-created right
must apply any rule of the state law, statutory or decisional, which
purports to have a substantial effect upon the outcome of the case."
The Supreme Court brought the instant case within the Erie doctrine
by the law of his domicile. . . . [A personal representative's] . . . capacity to sue or be
sued shall be determined by the law of the state in. which the district court is held.... .
(Emphasis added.)
24 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
25Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953, 957 (3d Cir. 1963).
26304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); but see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
- '$Klaxon Co. v. Stentor. Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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by holding that application of the law of the transferor state in the
transferee forum does not violate the Erie principal because "the
critical identity to be maintained is between the Federal District
Court which decides the case and the courts of the state in which the
action was filed.""
The Supreme Court decision dispelled the plaintiff's contention
that a change of venue would be accompanied by a change of law
and hence that the transfer would not be in the interest of justice.
The case was remanded to the district court, however, for reconsidera-
tion of the transfer order in light of the effect of this decision on
the convenience of witnesses and justice to the parties. In its holding
the Supreme Court stated that the damage rule to be applied in the
suit is a prominent, although not a controlling, factor to be con-
sidered in determining which forum would best serve the interest of
justice and be more convenient for parties and witnesses. Thus, the
Pennsylvania district court must look to the Pennsylvania choice of
law rules to determine whether the Pennsylvania or the Massachusetts
damage rule applies." Until recently it appeared unsettled whether,
under Pennsylvania law, the Pennsylvania or the Massachusetts
damage rule would be applicable." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recently held that the Pennsylvania courts are to apply the Pennsyl-
vania damage rule." In view of this holding, other factors being equal,
the need in the instant case for testimony from Pennsylvania wit-
nesses concerning loss of earnings and other factors relevant to com-
pensatory damages may compel a refusal to transfer because of con-
venience of parties and witnesses. If, however, Pennsylvania law had
dictated that the Massachusetts damage rule were to be applied, there
would be no need for Pennsylvania witnesses because under the
Massachusetts damage rule the amount of damages is determined
solely by the defendant's culpability. In this case, section 1404 (a)
might allow transfer to Massachusetts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Van Dusen holding preserves to the plaintiff all of the ad-
vantages which accrue to him by filing in a state favorable to his
cause of action, including favorable limitation statutes33 and choice
29 376 U.S. at 639.
" Under existing authority, a state may entertain an action based on another state's law
and at the same time refuse to enforce the other state's law with regard to damages. Kruger
v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916).
3' Compare Goranson v. Kloeb, 308 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1962), with Pearson v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
" Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964).
" See Gomez v. The S.S. Dorothy, 183 F. Supp. 499 (D.P.R. 1959).
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of law rules.' In this firm holding the Supreme Court has laid down
the doctrine that, if a case is transferred under section 1404 (a), the
transferee district court will apply the law of the state of the trans-
feror and, further, that the capacity to sue will be determined by the
law of the transferor state. Generally, all defenses available in the
transferor forum should be available in the transferee forum.
Had the Court held that the law of the transferee forum would
apply, a transfer would make a plaintiff's choice of forum almost a
nullity. In effect, the defendant could use section 1404 (a) as a means
of transferring the case to a state in which the law would be most
favorable to him. In addition, a holding that the law of the transferee
forum applies, under some circumstances, would grant to a district
court judge, when deciding whether to grant a section 1404(a)
transfer, the power to decide the case.3" Thus, if the law of the trans-
feree forum were applicable, it seems unlikely that the interest of
justice ever would be served by a transfer to a forum whose law
differed materially from that of the forum originally chosen by
the plaintiff.
The Court's interpretation of rule 17 (b) prevents a plaintiff from
blocking a transfer to a more convenient forum. If transfer were
denied in cases in which a plaintiff admittedly could have qualified
to sue in the transferee state but refrained from doing so, it would
have the effect of denying the defendant the advantages intended
by section 1404 (a) ; i.e., by his lack of action plaintiff could "freeze"
the location of the trial. When Congress enacted section 1404 (a), it
intended to allow transfer "for the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses" and obviously did not intend such a result.
James W. Curlee
"See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
"'Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960).
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